Previous researchers argue that the legal and regulatory environment helped shape the German financial system in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, with particular emphasis on the damaging effects of the stock-exchange law of 1896. This paper finds that the stock exchange law of 1896 exerted little measurable impact on the growth and concentration of the universal banking system or on the business turnover of universal banks relative to securities markets. The paper also shows that the English commercial banking sector and the German universal banking sector underwent similar movements toward concentration between 1884 and 1920 (both accelerating after 1912), despite no corresponding regulatory changes in England-further suggesting that consolidation of universal banking resulted from factors other than the 1896 law.
The historical literature has traditionally paid much attention to the role of universal banking in the industrialization of Germany and has presumed, in line with Gerschenkron (1962) , that the system gained preeminence in the late nineteenth century due to the general 'backwardness' of the economy. Some researchers have stressed legal and political factors in the evolution of German financial institutions, placing particular emphasis on the Stock Exchange Law of 1896. 1 The 1896 law, because it restricted the allowable activities of the securities exchanges, is seen as promoting the growth and concentration and possibly also monopoly power in the universal banking sector. Two important tax levies on securities market business, arriving shortly before and after the 1896 law, are also considered as an catalyst for change in the financial system. Despite the many claims made about the impact of regulation and taxation, though, a convincing quantitative analysis of the multiple influences is still lacking.
The current paper begins to fill this gap by examining company law and stock exchange regulations from the 1870s until the onset of World War I and by investigating the measurable effects of this legal framework on the development of the universal banking sector from 1884 to 1913. The analysis covers three hypothesized areas of impact: concentration, overall growth, and volume of business relative to the stock markets. The findings indicate that the size and volume of the German universal banks developed in a strong, but sustained, manner throughout the period considered, and concentration of the sector increased less than the conventional wisdom supposes. None of the three considered indicators reacted significantly to the 1896 stock exchange law, but all three appear to have increased weakly in response to taxes. Comparison with the British deposit banking sector indicates that the two countries followed nearly identical paths towards increasing concentration between 1884 and 1920, and that indeed the greatest push
Underwriting new issues and admission of shares to official trading
The issuing of new securities in Germany proceeded primarily through the universal banks. Most flotations took place by simultaneous founding (Übernahmegründung), in which a promoter or underwriter took over the full amount of the issue and subsequently sold the shares to the public. Among other provisions, the 1870 company law, revised in the company law of 1884, required the full amount of an issue to be subscribed and at least 25 percent to be paid up before a new joint-stock company (Aktiengesellschaften and Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien) could be founded; for shares issued at higher than nominal value, 50 percent payment was required. 3 Underwriting issues on the basis of subscriptions, for either new or transformed firms, could therefore cause long delays and possibly failure of an issue to meet regulations and deadlines. Having an informed intermediary take over the full capital to be floated provided insurance to the company that the issue would succeed. In the German financial system, the logical providers of simultaneous underwriting services were the universal banks and, for large issues, the Berlin-based great banks in particular. Thus, while the central aim of the law was to provide insurance for potential investors, the regulation may have also affected the development of the universal banking sector.
Indeed, Robert Liefmann (1921) attributed the institutional structure of the German universal banks to this practice of simultaneous company promotions, and Whale (1930) suggested that the 1884 company law solidified the position of the universal banks as industrial firms' main conduit to the securities markets. In particular, the need to pay up, and, in some cases, hold shares in advance of operations and trading required substantial resources on the part of underwriters and therefore encouraged universal banks to expand both their capital and their customer networks. These incentives grew in line with the volume of new share issues-whether resulting from flotations of new companies, conversions of old private firms into share companies, or mergers and acquisitions of existing firms. Although the universal banks, and the private banks before them, arranged most company flotations even before the 1884 law, Whale (1930, p. 43) noted that the new law "can be held to have influenced the situation, in the sense that it provided new reasons for the intervention of the banks at a time when the original reasons were losing some of their force." This conclusion may overstate the impact of the 1884 law: if the need for simultaneous foundings, and therefore for large, universal banks, stemmed from stipulations on paying up shares, then the 1870 law 4 should have provided the necessary impetus long before the 1880's. Thus, Table 1 includes an "up" arrow for the impact on banking growth and concentration, but the effect should not be expected to be large.
In 1892, in response to major securities and commodities price declines in the previous two years, the legislature formed a stock exchange enquiry commission (Börsenenquetekommission) to investigate charges and recommend remedies. 4 The law that resulted, the 1896 Börsengesetz, contained a number of provisions regarding the issuing and listing of securities. The arrows in Table 1 reflect the countervailing influences of this law. For joint-stock firms transformed out of existing private companies, the new law stipulated a waiting period of one year after entry into the commercial registry, as well as a published balance sheet and profit and loss statement for that year, before the shares could be admitted to official trading. 5 In addition, only fully paid up issues could be officially traded. It is commonly believed that these restrictions, while perhaps protecting shareholders, created a need for greater bank credit, pushed more securities trading from the exchanges to the universal banks, and compounded the incentives for growth and concentration of universal banking stimulated by the earlier company laws.
The 1896 law also created new governing institutions for the exchanges to ensure closer scrutiny of new issues and stipulated tighter enforcement of regulations and legal recourse to injured parties.
Moreover, the law provided for greater independence in the body admitting securities to the exchanges (the Zulassungstelle); dictating, for example, that half the members must not be listed in the stock exchange register, a third must not be involved in securities trading, and nobody involved in a new issue would be permitted any say in the acceptance of that issue to trading. 6 The legislation reinforced the liability clauses of the 1884 law, making underwriters specifically responsible for damages to investors stemming from false or misleading information provided in the required prospectus for new securities (unless investors could reasonably have known that the information was incorrect). Together, these stipulations were intended to assure investors of a minimum level of quality of securities traded at the exchanges and to ameliorate the natural information asymmetries between firms and outside investors as well as between underwriters and securities purchasers. If effective, the law should have improved confidence in the exchanges and promoted greater use of securities and of equities in particular. This effect corresponds to a "down" arrow in the third column of Table 1 , since it means that business would be expected to increase at stock exchanges (and not necessarily at banks) and might even migrate from banks to markets.
The influence of these protective provisions, however, may well have been offset by the restrictions on new issues and by the most contentious measure in the new law: the prohibition on futures trading in the securities of mining and factory enterprises as well as in a wide range of commodities (grain and mill products). The ban on futures essentially closed down the Berlin commodities exchange, and, it has been argued, hampered the operations of the spot securities market. The ban is also argued to have pushed more securities trading into the universal banking system, as those institutions attempted to simulate futures contracts. Naturally, centralized banks with larger clienteles and dealings in wider ranges of securities-in this case, the great banks-would have gained an advantage over smaller, provincial banks and private bankers. The lack of futures trading is also thought to have increased the demand for cash, and therefore for bank credit, for securities transactions. Thus, the futures prohibition is also thought to have spurred further universal banking concentration. Table 1 therefore indicates a positive effect of the futures ban on all three areas of influence. It is thought that these effects on concentration proved difficult to reverse and lingered even after the 1908 novelle rescinded the blanket prohibition of futures trading. So, while Table   1 indicates a negative effect for the lifting of the ban, such an impact is hypothesized to be small.
Taxation of bourse transactions
It is easy to see how imposition of taxes on securities market business might dampen market activity, particularly when substitute services are available. Stock exchange taxes, consisting of a stamp tax on final certificates of transfer (Schlussnotenstempel) and a tax on all new issues of securities (Emissionsstempel), were introduced in 1881. 7 In 1885, a one-tenth per-thousand tax replaced the flat tax on trades. Nine years later, the tax was doubled to two-tenths per thousand and was imposed on all amounts-not just on every thousand marks. Very small transactions, those less than 600 marks, remained exempt. The 1900 stamp tax law eliminated this exception, increased all rates further, and initiated a tax on the issue and transfer of mining stocks (Kuxe). These changes represented major cost increases for the securities underwriting and brokerage businesses in the space of 20 years.
At the time of the 1885 tax legislation, some policy makers, economists and businessmen recognized that the tax might create an incentive for concentration in banking. Since banks could balance purchase and sale orders outside of the bourse and pay the tax only on the net transaction, large universal 6 banks benefitted from a network externality of sorts: larger clienteles meant a broader market for securities and therefore more untaxed commissions on internal trades. Thus, the tax spurred universal banks to increase their customer base, and such growth meant encroachment of the large urban banks on provincial bank territory. The tax savings allowed larger universal banks to decrease commission rates to rates well below those charged by smaller, provincial banks. As tax rates increased, so did the savings from internal trading. This situation persisted until June of 1900, when the new tax law eliminated the exemption on internal, or compensatory, transactions.
Riesser argued that compensatory transactions gave the great banks an insuperable advantage over the provincial banks. The advantage of the large, Berlin banks was exaggerated due to the double taxation of provincial banks executing orders through their Berlin correspondents. 8 Until this system was amended by the 1894 stamp act, the extra tax burden added to the commission and brokerage costs borne by the provincial bankers, and therefore by their customers. Table 1 indicates the contradictory influences that the 1900 tax law had on the concentration and business of the universal banking sector: a positive impact from tax rate hikes but a dampening effect from the closing of loopholes favoring large banks.
Price setting on the exchanges
German exchanges were call markets throughout the period studied here, and price setting changed comparatively little during that time; though the 1884 and 1896 stock exchange laws formalized certain institutions that were already common practice, at least in Berlin. Official brokers (vereidigte Maklern) set securities prices based on the unified price system, in which brokers balanced purchase and sale orders and determined, after a round of price announcements and recalculations, the final binding price for all orders placed that day. According to the 1884 law, the official brokers were appointed for life terms and were legally prohibited from trading on their own accounts or joining with other brokers.
The unified price system arguably insured a significant level of transparency and therefore confidence in securities transactions on the Berlin exchange. 9 On the other hand, contemporary observers claimed that price setting was not exact or reliable enough and that, in setting the market price, the brokers often followed the wishes of interested bankers, especially when a deal could not be executed on the given day. 10 Such critics added to the voices calling for reform in the early 1890's.
Thus, it is difficult to hypothesize about the impact of the 1896 law on confidence in and use of the exchanges. To the extent that pricing institutions predated the 1896 law, little change would be expected. But the new regulations also stipulated that prices be officially set by the exchange directors, in the absence of outsiders (i.e., only the commissioner, secretary, brokers, directors, and representatives of other trades prescribed by exchange regulations were permitted to be present). If these rules minimized opportunities for tampering with independent price setting, then the law may have indeed improved transparency and public confidence in the exchanges. Thus, for the price-setting components of the 1896 law, Table 1 indicates a negative hypothesized influence on the business turnover of banks relative to markets.
Empirical analysis of regulatory and tax influences on universal banking, 1884-1913
The preceding discussion presents three separate ways in which regulations enacted between 1884
and 1913 influenced the universal banking sector-growth of the sector overall, concentration in the sector, and the expansion of the sector's business at the expense of securities markets. The goal of the following analysis is to create quantitative measures of these three types of impact, recognize general patterns in these variables over time, and identify regulatory influences while controlling for other relevant factors.
The catalog of effects given in Table 1 Unfortunately, since most of the necessary data series begin in 1884, it is impossible to provide a baseline against which post-1884 data can be compared. Given the imposition of the percentage tax on stock transfers in 1885, it would be difficult to disentangle the influences of the new company law and the increased taxes in any case. The following analyses therefore restrict attention to legislative and economic events after 1884. The remaining data series still permit investigation of the regulatory changes of the 1890s. Even if the 1884 law set the processes of growth and concentration into motion, the later laws are commonly viewed as even more influential on the German economy. If these laws were as significant as hypothesized in past historical work, their effects should compound existing trends and therefore be picked up in the current analysis. From an historical point of view, this marginal impact is of the greatest interest.
Universal Banking Concentration
The first hypothesis is that the universal banking industry became significantly more concentrated between 1884 and 1913, and that this tendency was most pronounced after the tax and regulatory changes of 1894 and 1896. Since nearly the beginning of the universal banking system in Germany commentators have remarked, sometimes with great alarm, on the concentration of economic power within the great banks.
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In 1910, the well-known great banker Jacob Riesser proclaimed that "...the movement toward concentration precipitates itself headlong like a flood and proceeds with awful violence, as if all contrivances for stemming the tide had been swept away and all dams had been destroyed by some natural catastrophe." In order to measure concentration, of course, a line must be drawn. The extent of integration of the provincial banks varied significantly, and all group banks remained at least partially independent unless and until they were fully absorbed by another bank. Integration of bank groups could progress slowly and is also difficult to measure with existing data. The Schaaffhausen-Dresdner IG is a good example of the impermanence of some cooperative arrangements as well as the fact that not all led to merger. Ultimately, These findings also corroborate the claims of Weber (1915) , regarding the concentration of German deposits within the Berlin joint-stock banks. The point raises a subsidiary but closely related issue:
the ability of the largest banks to foster their brokerage and investment banking business through the development of deposit networks throughout the country. By increasing their presence outside Berlin, the great banks not only expanded their funds for lending, but they also created demand for securities, both new and old. Thus, since the hypothesized incentives for banking concentration stem from provisions regarding the securities business, we should expect that the greatest increases in concentration appear in measures based on deposits.
The great-bank ratios show similar patterns. While the great banks' share of total assets rose from around 43 percent in the early 1890's to over 55 percent in 1905, the ratio changed much less over the full period-from approximately 48 percent in 1884 to 52 percent in 1913-and experienced far greater growth during and after World War I. Corresponding ratios for share capital show even less change-beginning and ending the period at about 40 percent. Deposit-based concentration ratios for the great banks (not pictured) follow nearly the same path, though the ratio is slightly lower in the years before 1900 and slightly higher thereafter. As hypothesized, the deposit-based ratio increases the most, but the total change is still rather small (growing from 47 percent in 1884 to 53 percent in 1913). Even more pronounced than with the 5-firm ratios, concentration increased the most in 1888, 1894-95 and 1901-4, did not increase much at all in the wake of the 1892 formation of the stock exchange inquiry commission, and actually declined following the 1897 implementation of the 1896 law.
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So far, these measures exclude an important component of the German industrial banking system: the private bankers. The commercial and investment banking industry underwent significant organizational change over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with private bankers comprising a declining share of the sector, especially toward the end of the period. Private bank assets, by their nature, are difficult to count, but Goldsmith's (1969) estimates suggest that they amounted to at least that of jointstock banks in the 1880's but only half between 1900 and 1913. When private banks are included, the concentration ratio for total assets falls to 16 percent in 1884 but reaches over 33 percent by 1913.
Advanced statistics are unnecessary to spot the positive trend here, and this trend also swamps some of the yearly changes that are apparent in the joint-stock only ratios. Most notably, the inclusion of private bank assets smooths the decline and then rebound of the joint-stock ratios between 1895 and 1905, giving the appearance of steady increase. Interestingly, the sharp increase of 1892-5 and the decline of 1906-08 are both still apparent in these new ratios.
One should consider, however, whether private banks ought to be included in full in the denominator of these concentration ratios. Only a small percentage-albeit mainly the largest-of these banks competed with the joint-stock universal banks in commercial banking, brokerage, deposit-taking, or underwriting. Many served a clientele that never dealt with joint-stock universal banks. The relevant measure of universal banking concentration may therefore lie somewhere between those computed only with joint-stock banks and those that include all private banks. Unfortunately, there would be no way to determine the assets or even the existence of each and every private bank, much less categorize them all according to their clientele and lines of business.
The figures calculated here differ slightly from those presented in Tilly (1995) , in which Figure   1 shows the equity capital of the six largest Berlin banks accounting for under 13 percent of the total in 13 come from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976), Saling's Börsen-Jahrbuch, and Handbuch der deutschen
Aktiengesellschaften for the joint-stock banks and from Raymond W. Goldsmith (1969) , for the private banks (using linear interpolation between his estimates for 1880, 1900, and 1913). Tilly uses figures from Bosenick (1912) and the Deutschen Ökonomist for the Berlin banks. The source of the discrepancy is unclear, but it may be the calculation of private bank assets. Since private banks were not compelled to report any financial information, particularly not on an annual basis, it is exceedingly difficult to determine the size of the sector. 16 If the Tilly figures use total assets of private banks but only equity capital for the joint-stock banks, then the concentration ratio would appear to be lower throughout the period, but this difference should be offset by the fact that he uses six banks rather than the five used here. While the differences in individual years are rather small, they yield obviously disparate trends in concentration overall.
Concentration in universal banking certainly increased at least somewhat over the period in question; but the change, even considering the private bankers, was likely more moderate than that The regression results also reveal something less obvious: that there was no marked increase in concentration-as measured by the share of the great banks in total universal bank assets-after 1892, 1894, or 1896 (Table 2 ). The interaction of these sub-period indicators with the trend variable produces similarly insignificant coefficient estimates for this concentration measure. The joint-stock five-firm concentration measure, however, is significantly higher and increased faster after 1894 than before. Neither effect emerges for the post-1892 or post-1896 indicators. These findings would suggest that the tax increase of 1894 was the most significant of the regulations imposed during this period, and that indeed the muchdiscussed stock exchange law of 1896 created no apparent effect. Such an inference is further bolstered by the significance of the turnover tax variable for the first concentration variable (including private banks).
Moreover, in this specification (column four of Table 1 ), the tax variable renders the trend insignificant.
Somewhat puzzling, however, the tax variable is statistically insignificant for the joint-stock-only concentration measure.
The lack of response to the formation of the 1892 stock exchange enquiry commission may indicate that bankers only gradually determined the ramifications of the impending legislation, expected the law to be weak, or calculated that the provisions did not warrant early reaction. Indeed, Borchardt's (1999 Borchardt's ( , 2000 discussion of Weber's work on the enquiry commission suggests that the promulgation of a stock exchange law by 1896 took many observers by surprise. It is also possible that the universal banks saw the merit of increasing their capital in 1892 but were unable to do so until the improvement of economic conditions beginning in 1894-at which point there were other reasons to expand. These results differ from those in Tilly (1995) and Wetzel (1996) other regulatory influences at work (such as tax laws) and also fails to account for the potential overall trend toward universal banking concentration. In addition, OLS regression fails to correct for the obvious serial correlation in the errors. In the present analysis, Cochrane-Orcutt regression greatly reduces the coefficient (and its significance) on the post-1896 indicator variable. These methodological differences are important, and they make the current findings more powerful than previous ones.
Part of the discrepancy between the current results and those reported by Tilly, however, must stem from differences in the underlying data: using Tilly's specification on my data still yields insignificant coefficients on either a post-1896 or a post-1892 indicator. As my data come from the banks' annual reports (as reported in the HDAG and Saling's), there is good reason to trust the accuracy of the numerator of my concentration ratios. Moreover, the Deutsche Bundesbank statistics provide the most widelyaccepted figures for total joint-stock credit (universal) bank assets, making the denominator of the jointstock-only ratio also highly dependable. As noted, private bank assets are difficult to estimate, and therefore any concentration ratio that attempts to account for private bank assets will lack precision. Thus, for conceptual as well as practical reasons, the joint-stock-only ratio reported here is likely the most accurate and compelling measure available. Such a ratio is not comparable to Tilly's more general ratio.
Growth of universal banking
Although expansion was likely most pronounced among the largest universal banks, regulatory Because of the smoothing of the estimated private bank assets, this analysis focuses on the jointstock banks. The dependent variable is the real value of total joint-stock universal bank assets, but average values of these banks' assets produce nearly the same results. The inclusion of private banks has little impact on the conclusions of the analysis, since it is clear that estimated private bank assets increased little throughout the period from 1884 to 1913. Regressing the log of assets, in real terms, on a constant and time trend yields annual average growth rate estimates of less than half of one percent per year for the private banks, compared with a rate of 6.8 percent for the joint-stock universal banks. The growth in jointstock universal banking average stemmed both from the setup of new banks and from increases in the size of banks. Average assets per joint-stock universal bank grew at an estimated average of 3.6 percent per annum in this period. Given the historical record describing the absorptions of private bankers by jointstock banks, it is likely that the number of private banks was declining, at least in the decade before WWI.
Thus, the fact that estimated private bank assets grew at all in real terms suggests that the remaining private bankers were actually growing as well. Not surprisingly, given the previous discussion, great bank
and provincial bank assets demonstrate similarly strong trends. 20 This result further demonstrates the extent to which the trend on concentration (measured with private bank assets) stems from the relative lack of growth of private bank assets. Table 1 points to 1892, 1894, 1896, and 1900 as hypothesized inception points for growth spurts for the universal banking sector. As with concentration, however, the results reported in Table 3 show that none of these indicator variables yields statistically significant coefficients either in their levels (that is, a shift in the constant) or when interacted with the trend variable. This insignificance could imply that the legal changes of the late nineteenth century made no perceptible impact on the growth of the universal banking sector. The stock exchange tax variable (last column of Table 3 ), however, suggests a slightly more complex story. 21 The turnover tax rate relates very positively to universal banking assets, even though the post-1894 sub-period variable does not. Interestingly, however, the significance of the tax variable in the regression hinges on controlling for the real volume of new issues. The volume of new issues grew rapidly over the period but was slightly, though not statistically significantly, dampened by the imposition of stock taxes. Only after controlling for this underlying force for expansion, and its negative relationship to tax rates, does the growth effect of the tax rate increases emerge.
In line with expectations, particularly in light of the immediately preceding discussion, the volume of new issues of domestic shares relates significantly (positively) to joint-stock universal bank assets. After the overall trend, the new issues effect is the strongest, both in magnitude and statistical significance. Since the regression also includes a trend variable, of course, we ensure that the effect is not simply proxying for a trend variable. This result, along with the turnover tax finding, underscores the importance of the securities business to the universal banking sector and, more broadly, the inter-dependence between universal banking and securities market institutions. Various authors Weber, 1915, for example) estimate great bank commissions on trading and underwriting of securities at approximately 30 percent of profits in the early twentieth century. Provincial banks, as a whole, depended less on the securities business, and this fact is born out in re-running the growth regressions using only provincial bank assets. If we consider only provincial banks, both the new issues variable and the tax rate lose their magnitude and significance.
General economic prosperity also appears to explain a greater part of the observed trend in universal banking growth than do regulatory events. In contrast to concentration of assets, logged levels of real universal bank assets relate positively to changes in real net national product. So, it appears that growth in the real economy goes hand in hand with development in the financial sector-at least those financial institutions most responsible for financing industry. It is worth noting, however, that provincial bank assets are unrelated to real NNP, so that the real-financial link is not as strong as might be expected.
This finding is relevant to the recent literature on the finance-growth relationship, and tends to qualify some of the claims of the causal importance of financial institutions for real growth. Specifically, if financial growth were a primary impetus for real development, then surely the provincial universal banking sector, not just the great banks, should contribute significantly to real growth. 22 Two final variables that related positively with universal banking concentration, average value of new issues and share price levels, do not help explain growth in the universal banking sector overall and are therefore excluded from the reported regressions. Both of these variables were expected to be weaker correlates, and this expectation is borne out by the results. The other findings are robust to these specification changes.
Universal banks versus stock markets
While it is now clear that German universal banks, and especially the largest such institutions, expanded operations over the period 1884-1913, the question remains whether banks simultaneously usurped business from the exchanges and, if so, whether regulatory change encouraged this displacement.
The relevant line of business, of course, is securities trading, since bankers could partially substitute for the exchanges in these transactions. Unlike concentration or size, quantity of business done is very difficult to measure, particularly for securities trading. It is nearly impossible to quantify trading volumes outside official secondary markets in Germany, and the universal banks themselves did not report the volume of such business. The business turnover of universal banks may serve as a useful, though obviously imperfect, proxy for securities trading within the universal banking system. The variable at least reflects the growing business of the universal banks, a significant portion of which was devoted to brokerage transactions, and may be compared with the volume of turnover on the exchange. 23 In addition, using this variable allows comparison with Tilly's (1995) results, since he uses a similar measure.
There is little theoretical work on the determinants of trading volume; and at least one prominent theory implies that there should be no trading at all: prices provide 100 percent of portfolio adjustment.
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Thus, in the absence of a standard, empirically-testable model of stock exchange volume, the following econometric models (Table 4) Continuous variables for actual tax rates or percentage changes in those rates, however, provide negative explanatory power for the increase of universal banking business relative to the exchanges.
Relative turnover is clearly positively correlated with both tax rates, and simple OLS regression yields very significant positive coefficients of taxes. Yet there is a great deal of autocorrelation in the series, and Durbin-Watson statistics are extremely low. Once trend is accounted for, the additional effect of the taxes (in levels or differences) is negative. The causal link, however, may run in the opposite direction.
Cochrane-Orcutt Regressions that replace the turnover ratio with the numerator and denominator of that ratio, and control for the same influences controlled for in the ratio regressions, indicate that the tax effect comes from a very significant positive relationship between issue tax rates and stock exchange turnover.
One might reasonably speculate from this result that bursts of activity on the stock exchange allowed tax increases to be implemented. But since volume is composed of price and quantity, it is still technically possible that increasing the tax on issuing securities increased the measured volume of trading on exchanges through a price effect.
Despite the significance of the post-1894 indicator, the only discontinuous increases in the ratio appear after 1907, when there were no regulatory measures introduced that could be expected to have produced such an effect. Joint-stock universal bank turnover began 1907 at 84 percent of Berlin stock exchange turnover, but ended the year at over 171 percent of the market's turnover. The ratio then increased over 20 percent in 1908, but returned to its pre-1907 course in 1909. By 1910, universal bank turnover was back to 80 percent of market turnover, but it began another upswing to 149 percent in 1913.
As figure 3 illustrates, the majority of changes in the turnover ratio stem from large changes in the turnover of the exchange, and 1907 was a particularly troublesome year for the German stock markets. For the most part, universal banking turnover progressed in a rather steady manner after the beginning of the economic expansion starting in 1894.
Not surprisingly, given the presence of stock exchange turnover in the denominator of the turnover ratio, the stock price index offers strong, negative predictive power in the regression analysis. Since market turnover, or volume, is real price times quantity, the real price of securities must be a component of that variable. In the current study, however, the correlation between stock exchange turnover and securities prices is weakened, because trading volume is estimated from tax receipts, rather than from direct records of trading activity. Indeed, curiously, Berlin market turnover itself is hardly correlated with the stock price index (less than 8 percent for real volume and 28 percent for nominal volume). The much tighter correlation comes between universal bank turnover and the stock price index (70 percent). Thus, the turnover ratio is actually positively related to the stock price index in a simple correlation. The exclusion of the stock price index from the regressions has one effect: it eliminates the significance of the post-1894 variable (both alone and interacted with trend).
Real indicators of economic activity, represented here by real NNP per capita, are also insignificant in explaining relative bank turnover. Given the lack of theoretical modeling for bank or market turnover, this result is not unexpected. The fact that the regulatory variables provide little statistical power is at least in line with the findings for concentration and universal banking industry development. Thus, if the jointstock universal banks were gaining business at the expense of the exchanges, it is difficult to tie that development closely to the regulatory changes of the 1890's.
Impact of regulation versus general trends
The findings here suggest that, even though regulatory changes and tax levies on securities business in theory may spur universal banking concentration, growth of the corporate banking sector overall, or displacement of business from markets to banks, the new German laws of the 1890's made little observable impact. Such a finding may result from a number of circumstances. First, the laws may really have had little impact, either because the changes were small or because the provisions were not fully implemented.
Second, the laws may have only added to other factors-such as new efforts to capture economies of scale and scope in financial services itself and responses to the growing scale of industrial firms financed by the universal banks-that were already encouraging changes in the industrial organization of universal banking.
In other words, the laws may have actually had some discreet impact, but they may have been masked by the other changes in the economy of the time. Third, the laws may have had the expected impact, but the effects may have been spread over several years-giving the impression of a general trend.
It is difficult, of course, to differentiate among these three possible interpretations, but international comparison may help. Comparing Germany with countries that did not impose such stock market regulations and did not levy similar taxes at the same time offers insight into general trends in the banking sector over this period. From this perspective it appears that changes in the German universal banking industry did not hinge on the implementation of the 1896 stock exchange law or even on the levying of taxes throughout the 1884-1913 period. In the case of universal banking concentration, for example, it is commonly argued that several other European countries underwent similar adjustments to their banking industry structure over the same years, despite the wide variation in their regulatory systems.
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The English financial system (and that of the U.K. more broadly) makes a particularly useful comparison: it was unconstrained by regulations like the Germans', maintained a very active stock market, and had specialized commercial banks rather than universal banks. By the turn of the twentieth century, the government imposed no significant barriers to deposit banking growth and concentration, having eliminated size restrictions during the liberalization of banking laws in the 1820s.
Two points are clear from a comparison of concentration ratios (Table 4 and Evidence on the expansion of the two banking systems also suggests that Germany was not propelled toward extreme bank-orientation by the 1890s taxes and regulations. Indeed, viewing from the total size of the universal/deposit banking sectors relative to the size of the economy (measured as national product), it appears that the German banking industry merely began to catch up with the British over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Even by the start of World War I, the point at which most scholars acknowledge that the German economy had successfully industrialized, the German universal banking sector (including estimated private bank assets) was still smaller than the UK deposit banking sector, relative to national product. 27 The comparison with Britain, as well as the extension of the time series to 1920, suggests that forces other than regulation played the major part in the industrial organization of the German universal banking sector. Thus, even if it is impossible to prove conclusively that regulation had no impact, it is possible to surmise reasonably that universal banking concentration and growth would have progressed rapidly even without regulation. There are several possible explanations for such a trend toward growth and concentration: increasing demand for a few large banks to serve growing and merging industrial firms, increasing availability of scale and scope economies in the financial services business itself, or a simple progression toward a more rational structure in the banking sector (identifying and capturing existing economies of scale and scope or stability gains from branching). In fact, all three possibilities may have worked in concert. 28 Clearly, in light of the different regulatory regimes in the two countries, nonregulatory explanations should be explored. In particular, the connection between industrial and banking concentration requires further investigation. In Britain, the existing evidence for a causal link is weak; but for Germany, the proposition has yet to be tested rigorously. 
Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of regulation and taxation on the German universal banking system between 1884 and 1913. The historical literature suggests that legal changes and tax levies produced marked increases in universal banking concentration, overall growth of the universal banking sector, and substitution of universal banking services for securities markets trading. The 1896 stock exchange law receives the greatest attention and is presumed to have made the strongest impression. The empirical exercises here examine all three types of development in the universal banking sector and produces several new insights.
The analysis reveals that assets, concentration, and relative turnover in the universal banking sector grew steadily from 1884 to 1913. The appearance of continuously increasing concentration in the universal banking sector, however, hinges on the inclusion of estimated private banking assets in the concentration measure; and it is debatable whether most private banks should be placed in the same category as jointstock universal banks. None of the three variables demonstrate robust, discreet shifts after the enactment and implementation of any of the examined legislation. In particular, concentration among German universal banks grew at similar rates both before and after the 1896 stock market law, and there is little or no evidence that the 1896 legislation pushed business from the exchange to the universal banks in any significant way. The universal banking sector does appear to have grown faster after the general economic boom that started in 1894, which likely contributes to the appearance of some increase in the three variables at that point. Moreover, rates of securities issue and turnover taxes appear in some models as significant factors in explaining concentration, growth, and relative turnover. Thus, if any of the legal changes made an impact, it appears to have been the increases in taxes. The tax effect, however, is not tremendously robust. Thus, the results imply that, at least after 1884, the tangible effects of individual pieces of legislation were small.
It is tempting to attribute the lack of discrete institutional change to early response to anticipated legislation or gradual enforcement of the enacted laws. Such a conclusion is undermined, however, by extension of the period of analysis to 1920 and by comparisons with a country that promulgated no such regulatory or tax changes (the UK). Transformations in the German universal banking sector accelerated during and after World War I, and concentration in particular progressed far more rapidly after 1912 than before. Moreover, despite the tax levies and trading regulations in Germany, the levels and increases in universal banking concentration were no greater than those experienced in the English commercial banking sector between 1884 and 1920.
These conclusions differ from those of other recent work on the German securities markets that focuses quite narrowly on the impact of the 1896 law. By acknowledging the many other factors at play during this period, the current work reveals the difficulty of isolating causal relationships between regulation and taxation on the one hand and financial system development on the other. Nonetheless, the findings still downplay the impact of the flurry of regulation and taxation in Germany in the period, particularly in light of international trends in banking industry growth and structure that lasted until well after World War I.
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Figure 3. Banking Concentration in Germany and England/Wales, 1884-1920
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